Iran bets on China to blunt Trump’s economic offensive

iranintl.com – China’s refusal to bow to US sanctions has raised hopes in Tehran that Beijing could blunt Washington’s new economic offensive, but a debate inside Iran reveals doubts over how far China is willing or able to go on Iran’s behalf.

China has warned that it would respond if Chinese companies were targeted by any significant expansion of US secondary sanctions related to Iran, prompting Iranian officials to portray Beijing as a potential obstacle to Washington’s effort to further isolate Tehran economically.

The question has become more pressing as the Trump administration weighs whether to extend its campaign to Chinese financial institutions.

Asked Thursday why Washington had not imposed new sanctions on Chinese banks dealing with Tehran, President Donald Trump suggested such measures could already be under consideration.

“You don’t know if I’m doing it. I don’t have to announce everything,” Trump said.

China’s war too?

Some in Tehran see China’s resistance as part of a much larger struggle with Washington in which Iran has become an important front.

Hasan Ameli, the Supreme Leader’s representative in Ardabil province, argued during Friday prayers that Beijing understood that the United States’ ultimate confrontation was with China rather than Iran.

“China fully understands that America’s main war, and the war of the future, is with China, and this war passes through Iran,” Ameli said. “If America gains control over Iranian oil, it will prepare for war with China.”

He described China’s position as “a major opening for Iran’s economy and a heavy blow to American sanctions,” arguing that Tehran could use it to ease Washington’s economic pressure.

Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s parliament speaker and the country’s special representative for China, also welcomed Beijing’s position.

“The Iran-China comprehensive strategic partnership is rooted in mutual respect, win-win cooperation, and a shared vision for a multipolar world. This relationship needs no one’s permission,” he wrote on X.

Alaeddin Boroujerdi, a member of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, pointed to China’s importance as one of Iran’s largest oil buyers and called for faster implementation of the two countries’ 25-year cooperation agreement.

“Given China’s opposition to American sanctions against Iran and its role as one of the largest buyers of Iranian oil, there is considerable potential for expanding trade and economic cooperation,” he said.

China’s interests, not Iran’s

But even among those who see China as an important counterweight to US pressure, there is skepticism over a crucial assumption: that Beijing’s interests and Tehran’s necessarily coincide.

Majid-Reza Hariri, head of the Iran-China Chamber of Commerce, said China was not confronting Washington because of any military or ideological alliance with Iran.

“Rather, its economic and strategic interests require it to preserve its trade independence,” Hariri told Khabar Online.

He acknowledged that intensified US pressure could inflict significant economic damage on Iran, but argued that Washington could not cripple the Iranian economy without broader international cooperation.

Relations with China and Iran’s neighbors, he said, remained important to the country’s economic resilience.

Iranian journalist Ata Bahrami similarly argued that Beijing’s position should be understood primarily as a defense of its own sovereignty and growing power rather than a commitment to Iran.

“Their clear message to Washington is: ‘We have grown stronger and you must respect our sovereignty,’” he said. “In fact, Iran is the starting point for demonstrating this power.”

The Hormuz contradiction

The limits of the partnership become more apparent in the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran’s own actions potentially conflict with Chinese interests.

Moderate journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi questioned whether Beijing could be expected to deepen its support for Tehran while Iran keeps closed a waterway through which China receives more than 40% of its oil.

Zeidabadi also pointed to the fact that Ghalibaf has yet to visit Beijing despite his appointment as Iran’s special representative for China, asking whether the delay could reflect Chinese frustration with Tehran’s refusal to end its threat over Hormuz.

The problem goes beyond political differences. Even if Beijing refuses to comply with US secondary sanctions and Chinese buyers remain willing to purchase Iranian oil, Tehran must still be able to move that oil out of the Persian Gulf under a US maritime blockade.

Overcoming that obstacle would potentially require a level of Chinese involvement in Iran’s confrontation with Washington that Beijing has so far shown no willingness to undertake.

The debate inside Iran therefore exposes the gap between diplomatic resistance to US sanctions and the practical ability to defeat them.

Beijing may be willing to protect Chinese commercial interests and challenge Washington’s extraterritorial sanctions, but that is different from assuming the economic—let alone military—costs of Iran’s confrontation with the United States.

For Tehran, China may be Washington’s biggest obstacle in enforcing its economic campaign, but not necessarily Iran’s economic lifeline.