Monday , 16 November 2026

What Happens to Iran If Its Security Apparatus Collapses?

Iranwire – Unlike the 1979 Revolution – when the Islamic Republic took control of the Shah’s existing military and intelligence machinery – the current U.S.–Israel war against Iran raises a different possibility: that once the fighting ends, the country could be left facing a deep and possibly irreversible intelligence vacuum.

Iran’s intelligence personnel and their headquarters have been primary targets of U.S. and Israeli strikes. As the war continues, the question arises: what will be the state of Iran in a future devoid of military and intelligence forces?

According to statements released so far by the Israeli military (IDF), Seyyed Yahya Hamidi, the Deputy Intelligence Minister for Israeli Affairs, and Mohammad Baseri, a senior figure within the Ministry of Intelligence, are among those reported killed. Separately, Fars News Agency has confirmed the death of Gholamreza Rezaeian, who headed the Intelligence Organization of the Law Enforcement Command (FARAJA).

In addition to the main Ministry of Intelligence buildings on Shahid Araqi and Seyyed Khandan streets and the IRGC’s Tharallah Security Headquarters in Tehran, several other facilities were also targeted. Among them was the Intelligence Ministry building in Mahabad, which was attacked and destroyed on the night of March 2.

The start of this war has made the fate of Iran’s security system look increasingly similar to that of Iraq following the 2003 U.S. invasion.

Babak Derbiki, a political activist, told IranWire that a military and intelligence collapse creates a situation in which foreigners gain access to the country’s core documents. “Not everything is limited to ideological interests. Iran has conflicting interests with regional neighbors, such as water rights; an intelligence collapse creates massive risks for Iran’s energy security.”

Similarly, Omid Shams, a lawyer and spokesperson for the “Council of Lawyers for a Democratic Iran,” said that a wartime collapse would leave Iran with a systemic void. “It is natural for other countries to want to exploit this vacuum and extract effective intelligence from Iran.”

Six Institutions That Only Built “Files” on Individuals

Before the March 2026 attacks, various scenarios were proposed for a “post-Islamic Republic” Iran, ranging from a controlled transition to total collapse. Now, with the destruction of the Navy and the Air Force losing much of its effectiveness, what legacy remains?

The military framework inherited from Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in the late 1970s enabled Iran to withstand Saddam Hussein’s invasion for eight years. Today, however, there are growing questions about the resilience of the current security apparatus – especially in light of major intelligence failures, including the assassinations of Qasem Soleimani and Ismail Haniyeh.

After 1979, the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) was established in 1984. In later decades, multiple “parallel intelligence agencies” were created, including the IRGC Intelligence Organization, Judicial Protection Intelligence, and Police Intelligence.

Babak Derbiki told IranWire: “Generally, these institutions were busy ‘case-building’ against individuals—interrogations and reports used for political trials. The fate of these personal files and their potential for misuse after the regime’s fall is unknown, much as we still see SAVAK documents used against people today.”

The current trajectory points toward a fate similar to that of the “Istikhbarat” (Saddam’s intelligence service) after the fall of Baghdad.

Fear of Losing Critical National Assets and Data

 Strikes on IRGC and Ministry facilities have likely wiped out large volumes of data that could have been crucial for transitional justice and for documenting the regime’s alleged abuses. There is also concern that authorities may deliberately destroy records tied to financial networks used to evade sanctions, potentially erasing evidence of corruption.

Derbiki warns: “For years after the 1979 Revolution, we were unaware of many of Iran’s overseas assets. For example, Iran had shared interests with Pakistan in South Africa that others profited from for a long time. Now, with complex sanction-evading systems, many national assets held by individuals could remain ‘lost,’ resulting in a loss for the Iranian people.”

Omid Shams emphasizes: “Protocols must be established quickly to recover and protect this security system. You cannot leave a country empty of an intelligence infrastructure. While you are busy building a new organization, thousands of threats could hit the country.”

Iran Without Intelligence: A Defenseless Country

As the U.S. and Israel promise “regime change,” the question remains: how will any future administration govern without a security system?

Omid Shams argues: “You cannot move forward without keeping some of the intelligence personnel. You cannot navigate a transition with ‘zero staff’ while facing threats from the Taliban, ISIS, or regional rivals.”

He explains that while a “Nazi-style” core must be purged, some technical departments (such as anti-corruption units) might be salvageable. However, he warns, “Protocols are needed for document preservation, as loyalists will try to shred their own criminal records. We must be even more suspicious of remaining Islamic Republic agents than the world was of former Nazis or SAVAK agents.”

The continuous destruction of Iran’s infrastructure presents a picture of a “defenseless country” – a blank map that regional actors and extremist groups may soon try to redraw.

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