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iranwire – A century-old ghost haunts Iran’s parliament these days.
It has been invoked in fierce exchanges between lawmakers debating their nation’s deepening ties with Moscow.
The specter is Vladimir Liakhov, the Russian colonel who, in 1908, bombed Iran’s first constitutional parliament on orders from a despotic shah.
Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar, who ascended to the throne in January 1907, opposed the 1906 constitution ratified during the reign of his father, Mozaffar ad-Din Shah.
Soon after his accession, the Anglo-Russian agreement of August 1907 divided Iran into spheres of influence: a Russian zone in the north, a British zone in the south, and a neutral zone in the center.
Now, as Iran’s Islamic Republic grows increasingly dependent on Russian support, critics warn that history may be repeating itself – this time with the blessing of Iran’s most powerful figures.
“Liakhov is not just a name in Iran’s history,” Azar Mansouri, the secretary-general of the Iranian Reform Front, wrote in a sharp social media post that quickly spread through Iran’s political circles.
The message intensified an already heated debate over whether Iran has sacrificed its independence by relying on Russia for survival.
The controversy has turned Iran’s parliament into a battlefield, with lawmakers trading accusations of treason and servility.
On social media, hashtags such as “Parliament Bombarded Again” and “New Liakhovs Are Coming” show public anxiety about renewed foreign domination.
At the center of the controversy is Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the parliament speaker, who recently accused former President Hassan Rouhani and ex–Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif of undermining Iran’s “strategic cooperation” with Russia through “careless” remarks and actions.
The irony was not lost on Ghalibaf’s critics.
They quickly reminded him that during his own trip to Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin refused to meet with him despite expectations, forcing the speaker to return home empty-handed.
Yet Ghalibaf now leads the charge against Rouhani, his political rival who twice defeated him in presidential elections.
The parliamentary speaker’s attacks gained momentum after Zarif recently said that normalizing Iran’s relations with the West is “Russia’s red line.”
That claim angered pro-Russian figures within the establishment, who have grown increasingly vocal in defending Tehran’s shift toward Moscow.
When lawmakers shouted “Death to Fereydoun” on the parliament floor – using Rouhani’s original surname – some politicians took it as evidence of how deeply Russian influence has penetrated Iran’s ruling system.
Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, a former lawmaker and onetime journalist for the conservative Resalat newspaper, sharply broke with the pro-Russian camp.
“Russia has never had a strategic view of Iran,” he said. “They have used Iran at historical junctures as a bargaining tool with the West.”
Falahatpisheh added that “extremist Russia-lovers in Iran will one day have to answer for the damage this dependency has brought to the country.”
Such statements from a figure aligned with hardline circles suggest that the debate has fractured traditional political alliances.
The dispute no longer falls along the familiar reformist-versus-conservative divide. Instead, it pits those who view Russia as Iran’s salvation against those who see it as a dangerous surrender of sovereignty.
The latter group draws heavily on historical memory. Iran’s relationship with Russia spans centuries of territorial losses, broken promises, and interference.
During the 19th century, Russia seized vast Iranian territories in the Caucasus. In 1908, Liakhov’s bombardment of parliament crushed Iran’s constitutional movement.
During World War II, Soviet forces occupied northern Iran and initially refused to withdraw.
More recently, Russia delayed delivery of S-300 missile defense systems for years, citing international pressure.
Moscow also disappointed Tehran by supporting UN Security Council resolutions that imposed sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program.
Yet Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has embraced Putin with unusual warmth, even as the Russian president faces war crimes charges at the International Criminal Court over his invasion of Ukraine.
Khamenei praised Russia’s attack on Ukraine, making Iran one of only three countries, alongside North Korea and Belarus, whose leaders publicly endorsed Moscow’s aggression.
This alignment has practical dimensions. Iran has supplied Russia with attack drones used against Ukrainian targets.
In return, Tehran expects Russian diplomatic protection at the UN Security Council and access to advanced weapons systems.
Amir Hossein Sabeti, a hardline MP, defended the relationship by blaming “internal factors,” rather than Russian unreliability, for delayed weapons deliveries from Moscow and Beijing.
Critics called his reasoning absurd: even when Russia breaks its promises, blame falls on Iranian politicians instead.
Iran’s ambassador to Moscow, Kazem Jalali, has raised eyebrows with statements that sound more like Kremlin talking points than Iranian positions.
He recently claimed Iran never requested S-400 missile defense systems from Russia, contradicting years of reports about Iranian efforts to acquire those advanced weapons.
The controversy deepened after Russia declared it would not recognize the return of UN sanctions on Iran – a position aligning with Tehran’s interests but announced as Moscow sought Iranian military support.
Shortly afterward, Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, traveled to Moscow carrying a personal letter from Khamenei to Putin.
Iran’s president, already sidelined by Khamenei’s direct control over foreign policy, was not even nominally involved in the exchange.
The Supreme Leader felt compelled to correspond directly with a foreign government, bypassing normal diplomatic channels.
This dynamic reflects Iran’s diminished position.
After the 12-day war with Israel exposed its military vulnerabilities, and as the country faces economic collapse under sanctions and historic lows in domestic and international legitimacy, the Islamic Republic desperately needs Russian support.
But the price may be Iran’s ability to make independent decisions.
Critics argue that Tehran has become a “bargaining chip” Moscow can trade when negotiating with Western powers – exactly the role Iran has historically played in Russian strategy.
The current debate recalls the early 20th century, when Russian and British interference dominated Iranian politics.
The 1908 bombardment of parliament occurred because Mohammad Ali Shah, dependent on Russian support, ordered the attack when lawmakers challenged his authority.
That assault didn’t just dissolve parliament – it derailed Iran’s constitutional movement for years.
Yet it also galvanized Iranian nationalism and resistance to foreign domination.
The memory of Liakhov remains a symbol of what happens when rulers prioritize foreign patrons over national sovereignty.
Many Iranians now fear their government is repeating the mistakes of the Qajar dynasty, sacrificing independence for short-term security.
Defenders of the Islamic Republic counter that Iran has no choice. Isolated by American sanctions, Tehran must align with Russia and China to survive.
