Conscience Held Captive: The State of Religious Minorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Iranwire – Annual Report: 2024

Methodology Note: Iranian authorities impose severe restrictions on access to information and contact with victims of its repressive measures. Many Iranian activists, including those advocating for human rights, freedom of expression, and access to information, face harsh prison sentences for their work. Additionally, lawyers and others are routinely surveilled and threatened with similar consequences, affecting themselves and their families. 

A System of Religious Monopoly

Religious minorities in Iran face systematic barriers to equal human rights due to a state structure that is built and maintained to preserve a religious monopoly. The preamble of the constitution of the Islamic Republic declares that “Islamic principles and norms” are foundational for the “advancement” of “institutions of Iranian society.” Article 12 further enshrines Twelver Ja’fari Shiism as the official state religion, and ambiguous “Islamic criteria” or “Islamic principles” govern all facets of life, from political participation to criminal law. 

Religious minorities in Iran can be broadly divided into two main groups: those who enjoy official recognition and those who do not.

Officially Recognized Minorities and Conditional FreedomsChristians, Jews, and Zoroastrians enjoy limited freedoms in “rites and ceremonies,” “personal affairs,” and “religious education” “within the limits of the law” (Article 13). Some Sunni Muslim schools are also “accorded full respect” (Article 12). However, these rights come with significant restrictions. For instance, these groups are, in practice, further qualified (“Christians” include only heritage Assyrians, Chaldeans and Armenians, and not converts from Islam to Christianity). Exercising their limited rights is conditional upon compliance with state red lines.

The case of Zoroastrians is emblematic of these recognized groups. Through their constitutionally guaranteed seat in parliament, this ancient community has managed certain victories in recent years: equality in blood money payments, employment in the educational system (albeit for limited periods), and budget allocations for various social programs. But the essentially theocratic nature of Iran’s constitution and fundamental structural limitations to political participation (including confessional requirements and vetting by an unelected body of religious law experts, the Guardian Council) curtail full, meaningful exercise of political rights. IranWire contributor Ashkan Khosropour has termed the result a “a theater of peaceful coexistence” which permits minor, symbolic progress, while neutralizing calls for more fundamental change. Zoroastrian civil activist Keyvan Hoor told IranWire that the government’s approach to officially recognized religious groups is more characterized by “control” than outright “repression”: “They’re given permission to be active, but in the framework and conditions that are in step with the regime’s perspective.”

Non-Recognized Minorities and Intensified Persecution

Minorities without official recognition, including Baha’is, Christian converts, Yarsans, atheists, and followers of new religious movements, face an even harsher reality. Members of these groups are at a high risk of arbitrary arrest and prosecution (often on trumped-up security charges). They also face asset appropriation, denial of education and employment opportunities, restriction on worship and religious observances, and, in some cases, even capital punishment on charges of apostasy.“Minority” status in Iran is not simply a matter of demographics but also the outcome of a long-standing process of marginalization. Religious minority status may also overlap with ethnic identity, as in the case of Baluchs and Kurds, whose populations, concentrated chiefly in Iran’s border provinces, are predominantly Sunni Muslim.

This report, covering developments in the human rights situation of religious minorities in Iran in the year 2024, is based primarily on IranWire’s findings. The analysis relies on IranWire’s coverage of religious minorities in Iran, based on first-hand reports from members of these groups or by citizen journalists and verified by professional journalists, as well as secondary sources published by reliable human rights organizations.

Political Developments

On July 28, 2024, Masoud Pezeshkian, affiliated with Iran’s Reformist faction and of Azeri descent, assumed the presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Pezeshkian’s background and statements, such as his June 22 speech, “We, the people of Iran – Kurds, Turks, Baluchs, and others – have a right to make decisions, participate, and choose,” initially sparked some hope for progress among minority groups. 

Despite his campaign promises, Pezeshkian’s list of cabinet appointees ultimately excluded Sunnis. Pezeshkian’s cabinet selections were criticized by influential Sunni Baluch cleric Mowlana Abdolhamdi Esmailzehi, who said, “Discrimination must be eradicated. No ethnic or religious should have priority over another. Sunnis, who form the largest population after Shias, should have equal rights by law.”

In late October, Pezeshkian appointed Mansour Bijar, a Sunni Baluch, as governor of Sistan and Baluchistan Province; Bijar is the first individual of such ethnic and religious background to hold the position in half a century. In late November, Pezeshkian also visited Sistan and Baluchistan Province, where he met with local tribal and religious authorities to discuss regional issues, pledging dialogue. 

Minority rights activists were nonetheless skeptical about the potential for real reform under Pezeskhian’s leadership, citing the structural impediments within Iran’s political system. Farahnaz Fathi, a Yarsan activist, said, “With the Guardian Council’s supervision over presidential candidates [i.e., the unelected body’s power to vet and reject candidates] and a constitution that does not recognize Yarsans, changing president is like swapping game pieces without altering the strategy. Even if Pezeshkian wanted change, he’d be eliminated.”Awat Pouri, a Kurdish Sunni activist, voiced caution: “After a certain point, the president no longer influences the political space. One way of putting it is that unless Supreme Leader Khamenei’s directives change, the big-picture conditions won’t shift.”

Besides these structural limitations on the presidency in improving the situation of minority rights, other state officials, as well as government-affiliated media, sustained a campaign of defamation and harassment against these communities through the year. In August, the Young Journalists’ Club (affiliated with Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting) joined Khabar Online and Jahan News to accuse Baha’is of seeking to undermine Shia Muslim religious holidays. In September, the Supreme Leader’s representative in Lorestan province, Ahmadreza Shahrokhi, declared during Friday prayers that “The Baha’i sect has a wide connection with the Zionist regime and they spy for the enemy and promote immorality and corruption in religious ceremonies.” In September, Isfahan Friday Prayer Imam Seyyed Mojtaba Mirdamad proclaimed that all Iranians, regardless of religious affiliation who opposed the mandatory hijab were “apostates” – a charge that carries the death penalty in Iranian law. In November, against the backdrop of unprecedented geopolitical tensions and ongoing Israeli operations in Gaza, Mohammad Jafar Asadi, deputy commander of the IRGC-affiliated Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters, termed Jews “vile” in a live television broadcast, asking Iranian Jews: “Where is your outcry against the disgrace and shame brought upon the Jewish people under the guise of Zionism? Step forward and show yourselves.”

Judicial Repression

Religious minorities frequently face judicial repression for peaceful activities. In a judicial system lacking institutional independence (especially in the Revolutionary Courts that try political and security cases), such defendants are often charged with vaguely defined security violations under the Islamic Penal Code. 

Cases of Bahai’s

A spate of prosecutions of Baha’is intensified around the Iranian New Year in late March. According to IranWire reports, at least 85 Baha’is were summoned or imprisoned in Iran from the beginning of March through mid-May alone. 15 Baha’is – all women living in Baharestan in Isfahan – received summons on April 10 to appear before the Branch One of the Revolutionary Court of that city on May 1. They faced charges including “propaganda against the regime of the Islamic Republic” and “participation in perverse promotional and instructional activity contrary to Islamic shariah.” On May 18, the court sentenced them each to five years of imprisonment, 50 million toman fines, and a complementary sentence of a two-year ban on exiting the country and a five-year ban on social activities. On appeal, Brach 37 of the Appeals Court of Isfahan Province struck down the prison sentence of two of the women while upholding the other punishments on November 20. 

On July 3, Branch One of the Revolutionary Court in Babol tried defendants Niousha Badi’i Sabet and Suzan Eid Mohammadzadegan. They faced charges of “propaganda to the benefit of groups and organizations against the regime,” “propaganda against the regime,” and “forming a cell and group for purposes of disrupting national security.” These charges stemmed from classes taught by Sabet, a Baha’i psychologist focused on children and adolescent mental health, in Babol. Sabet used a book titled “The Language of Life,” translated by a Baha’i, to instruct non-Baha’i participants on preventing sexual harassment. On October 24, the court sentenced them to five years of prison for the charge of “educational and promotional activity contrary to Islamic jurisprudence,” as well as a supplementary sentence of an 18-month ban from educational activities. 

Cases of Christians

On November 15, Judge Mostafa Narimani of the Karaj Revolutionary Court sentenced Christian convert Dr. Toumaj Ariankia to ten years of prison and a two-year ban on social activities for a conviction of “propaganda against the regime by way of evangelizing Christianity,” “collaboration with hostile powers (Israel, the United Kingdom, and America),” and “membership in groups antagonistic to the regime.” Ariankia was initially arrested on October 24, 2022, after agents investigated his house and seized religious and personal writings. He then spent 27 days in solitary confinement at Karaj Prison, after which he was transferred to the general population, where he remained for 40 days. Ariankia is a member of the Christian Freedom Party of Iran and Pan-Iranist Party. 

Religious minorities in Iran continue to suffer from systemic due process failures that undermine their rights in legal proceedings.

Cases of Bahai’s

Roya Sabet, a 57-year-old Baha’i woman living in the United Arab Emirates, traveled to Iran in early January to visit ailing parents, only for Revolutionary Guards intelligence agents to raid her residence and seize documents needed for return travel on January 25. Sabet was summoned and eventually arrested on February 15. Taken to a detention facility belonging to the Revolutionary Guards, she was held incommunicado for three weeks before being permitted a closely-controlled phone call with her family. In the first three months of detention, she was granted just one opportunity to meet with family members in person, at a Prosecutor’s Office and in the presence of state agents. On May 20, she was abruptly transferred to Adelabad Prison in Shiraz, where family members were allowed to meet with her only in the presence of armed, camera-wielding agents. Through mid-June, she continued to be detained without formal charges. Authorities had told her family only that she was “not cooperating” with them, but they refused to elaborate. On August 15–half a year after arrest–Sabet was ultimately released on bail from Adelabad. 

Cases of Baluchs

Arresting agents routinely fail to produce warrants. On June 8, Ministry of Intelligence agents in Zahedan raided the house of Baluch Sunni cleric Bismallah Khougiani, Imam of the Sedighi Karimabad mosque, and took him into custody. A local informed source told the Baluch Activists Campaign that the officers failed to produce a warrant or communicate a charge against him.

Cases of Kurds

By July 28, three Sunni Kurds held in Orumieh Prison – Hossein Khosravi, Soleimani Adhami, and Heywa Nouri – had been charged with the potential capital crime of “armed rebellion.” Arrested in late January, they were detained in a Ministry of Intelligence facility for three months, during which, according to Kurdistan Human Rights Network, they were tortured to extract forced confessions. They also face charges of membership in the Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna organization and “propaganda against the regime.” The case was set to be adjudicated by Branch One of the Revolutionary Court in Orumieh. In early October, Khosravi and Nouri were temporarily released on bail; Adhami (a religious leader like Khosravi)continued to be held, and his case was transferred to the Special Court for Clerics. 

On November 25, Kurdish high school teacher Abollah Karimgoulan was arrested by security agents and taken to an undisclosed location. 12 days later, authorities had not disclosed his whereabouts or the charges against him. Another educator from Kamyaran County, Hamid Azizi, was arrested December 3 and similarly held incommunicado. 

Independently of failures of due process which may lead to wrongful detentions and convictions, those incarcerated in Iran may be denied fundamental rights as prisoners. Members of religious minorities, lacking the resources and influence to advocate for themselves, may be especially vulnerable to such abuses.

Cases of Baluchs

Obeidollah Hamali, a Sunni ethnic Baluch from the village of Homunat, Mehrestan County in Sistan and Baluchistan, was initially arrested during a home raid by Ministry of Intelligence agents on October 10, 2023, according to the Baluch Activists Campaign. The arrest was violent and ended in Hamali’s leg being broken. Agents sent him to a clinic in Iranshahr, where a superficial bandaging was performed. They then transferred Hamali to the Ministry of Intelligence detention facility in Zahedan County. By April 3 – 163 days into his detention – his leg was infected and his critical condition meant he needed medical care. Doctors in Zahedan said the physician in Iranshahr should continue treatment, and so he was sent back there, according to a local informed source. Hamali’s family had requested medical leave on bail so that he could be treated at a clinic; the Ministry of Intelligence had not granted this as of early April. On August 2, more than 300 days after his initial arrest, Hamali remained incarcerated, his legal fate and the charges against him unclear. 

Cases of Christians

Laleh Sa’ati, an incarcerated Christian convert, needed specialist neurological examination due to interrogator abuse as of mid-May; the Prosecutor’s Office denied such treatment. Sa’ati was arrested at her father’s house in Tehran on February 15. On March 26, she was sentenced to two years in prison and a two-year ban on exiting the country for a conviction of “acting against national security by way of communicating with Christian Zionist organizations” by Branch 26 of the Revolutionary Court of Tehran, presided over by Judge Parviz Afshari. The charges reportedly pertained to her attendance of house churches in Iran following her return from life abroad in Malaysia. In late June, Sa’ati was reportedly subject to new interrogations at Evin Prison where she was held. The Intelligence Ministry interrogators demanded to know how details of her case had reached the media. Agents had also reportedly threatened her mother with prosecution if she communicated with “hostile sites” and pressured other family members, some of whom had no Christian affiliation.   

Iran remains one of the world’s most active execution states, with one of the highest per capita death penalty rates. Religious minorities remain at disproportionate risk of capital punishment in the country. For instance, data from Iran Human Rights indicated that of the at least 975 executions conducted by the Islamic Republic in the year 2024 alone, 11% of those put to death were (predominantly Sunni) Baluchs, despite their ethnic group comprising only two to six percent of Iran’s population. In cases involving the death penalty, due process violations are even more concerning.

Cases of Kurds

On May 1, ethnic Kurd prisoner of conscience Anvar Khezri, a Sunni native of Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province, was put to death on a conviction of spreading “corruption on earth.” Transferred to solitary confinement the day before, he was not granted a final visitation with family members. His death sentence had been issued by Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court (presided over by Judge Salavati), reportedly under pressure from the Ministry of Intelligence office in Orumieh, following the Supreme Court’s overturning of an earlier capital verdict. In a letter published years after his early 2010 arrest, Khezri said he had confessed to interrogators under physical and psychological torture..

Cases of Yarsans

On August 6, 2024, Reza Rasa’i, a member of the Yarsan religious community who had been arrested in connection with the fall 2022 protests, was executed at Diezelabad Prison in Kermanshah. He had been convicted of being an accomplice in the murder of a local Revolutionary Guards Intelligence Division official. Branch Two of Criminal Court One in Kermanshah issued the verdict, which the Supreme Court upheld in a process marked by hastiness and due process violations. 

According to Rasa’i’s mother, her son’s 1,500-page file was reviewed and adjudicated within a week, based largely on the “judge’s knowledge,” a hazy and arbitrary criterion in Iranian jurisprudence. Rasa’i repeatedly denied the allegations, stating in court that his initial confessions were obtained under torture; these very confessions played a key role in his conviction. Authorities denied Rasai’s family a final visit and prevented them from burying him in a Yarsan cemetery, forcing them to use a burial site on the outskirts of Kermanshah. Security agents controlled the burial proceedings, allowing only close family members to attend.

Cases of Baluchs

On December 15, nine Baluchs were executed on drug-related convictions at prisons in Yazd and Zahedan. One of those executed, 22-year-old Alia Tardast (Shahouzaehi), was 18 at the time of his arrest and made his living transporting household appliances. Authorities reportedly told his family his verdict had been overturned, only to suddenly summon them for a final visitation. Another, 25-year-old Mohammad Vazir Roudini, had reportedly agreed to relocate an automobile which he did not know to contain drugs. These cases highlight the disproportionate effect of Iran’s war on drugs on economically marginalized minorities.

Cases of Jews

On November 4, Arvin Gharemani, a young Jewish man, was executed following Branch 29 of Iran’s Supreme Court rejection of his request for a retrial, despite indications of procedural irregularities and the failure of authorities to facilitate the blood money negotiation process that could spare his life. Gharemani was convicted of murder related to a street brawl in which another man died; his family maintained he was acting in self defense. Potentially exculpatory details of the incident, such as his efforts to help the injured man get to the hospital, were not recorded in the court’s ruling. The head of Iran’s Jewish Association said his requests to meet with the victim’s family to negotiate a blood money settlement (which could stop Gharemani’s execution under Iran’s qesas laws) and the local Friday Prayer Imam were rejected.

Cases of Sufis

Religious minorities may also fall victim to targeted killings by perpetrators with or without state affiliations. On the night of July 18, unidentified gunmen entered a Sufi lodge in a neighborhood in Saqqez and killed three people, including spiritual leader Azad Shahabi. Local law enforcement announced an investigation.

According to the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 36 on Article 6 of the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, the government of Iran has a duty to “take special measures of protection towards persons in vulnerable situations whose lives have been placed at particular risk because of specific threats or pre-existing patterns of violence,” including “members of ethnic and religious minorities.” 

More broadly, vis a vis such killings, the government is obligated to “[establish] by law adequate institutions and procedures for preventing deprivation of life, [investigate] and [prosecute] potential cases of unlawful deprivation of life, [and mete] out punishment and [provide] full reparation.”

As of late October, authorities had failed to make reliable information regarding the murder available to family members and the community. Sheikh Shahabi’s brother, who assumed his religious responsibilities after his death, believes the murder was a coordinated assassination and has repeatedly asked security authorities for more detailed information. Sheikh Shahabi had supported the late 2022 protests, especially intense in Kurdistan Province, and was killed shortly after reportedly refusing authorities’ request to use his influence to encourage participation in elections. 

When it comes to social and economic rights, Iran’s legal framework, paired with a history in which Shia Islam has been privileged over other currents, has produced striking inequalities along religious lines, which often intersect with ethnic identity. The state may also act directly, through judicial or other means, to strip minority members of property and livelihood.

Cases of Baha’is

Baha’is in particular are subject to forced business closures. On May 1, authorities shut down battery, radiator, and muffler shops belonging to at least four Baha’i proprietors in the cities of Shahrkord and Farakhshahr in Chaharmahal o Bakhtiyar Province. 

In early October, lawyer Sina Yousefi reported that the Ministry of Intelligence had summoned the heads of large retailers in Tabriz and other cities and forbid them from doing business with the Rafooneh company owing to its owner being Baha’i. 

On November 3, state agents in Qaemshahr, Mazandaran Province shuttered the businesses of three Baha’is: an optician store owned by Sohrab Loghaei Azar, a freezer-refrigerator repair shop owned by Kamran Babaei, and a stationery shop owned by Kamram Abedini. The agents moved at a time when the Baha’i owners had closed their businesses to observe a Baha’i religious occasion. 

Cases of Baluchs

In late November, it was reported that a Sunni Baluch family of eight living in Khash, Sistan and Baluchistan Province who sought national ID documents (necessary for a range of government services and benefits in Iran) was told by authorities they would be granted them on condition of converting to Shia Islam. 

Freedom of Assembly and Expression

Cases of Zoroastrians

Official religious minority organizations are, in some cases, compelled to echo state messaging. After the unexpected death of Ebrahim Raisi in May, the Zoroastrian Association of Tehran held a ceremony honoring him. The fact that the Association had held no such ceremony for a political leader since the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Komeini in 1989, coupled with the fact that such proceedings are never organized spontaneously in Iran, suggests coercion by authorities.

Religious Sites

Cases of Baha’is

In March and April, unknown vandals defaced the Baha’i cemetery in Semnan on multiple occasions, an informed source told IranWire. The vandals sprayed derogatory, inflammatory language on the building used for traditional body washing as well as gravestones. Local religious authorities have encouraged such acts with anti-Baha’i messaging in recent years.

On August 17, unidentified individuals vandalized a historic 110-year-old Baha’i cemetery in Ahvaz, Khuzestan, setting fires and cutting down mature trees. The vandalism occurred against the backdrop of authorities’ denial of burial rights to local Baha’is since 2016-2017, which has forced the community members to use alternative cemeteries. Such acts of desecration are often encouraged by inflammatory rhetoric from local state-affiliated Shia clerics, while vandals enjoy impunity. 

Cases of Sufis

A video obtained by IranWire on October 14 records an assault by plainclothes forces on a Sufi lodge in Saqqez which was formerly headed by Sheikh Azad Shahahbi, who was murdered in uncertain circumstances in July. Agents beat those gathered and seized a number of electronic devices. Informed sources reported the raid follow the Sufi’s inscription of the word “martyr,” as well as lines of Kurdish-language poetry, on Shahabi’s grave. 

The unexpected death of Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May raised a too-often overlooked aspect of the religious minority human rights crisis: denial of the right to truth about past grave violations. As a Tehran vice prosecutor, Raisi was involved in the three-man “death committees” which, in secretive and highly arbitrary proceedings in the summer of 1988, condemned political dissidents (many serving prison sentences) to death. In the case of secular leftists in particular, death committees would issue capital verdicts solely because individuals failed to identify themselves as Muslim: a flagrant, inquisitorial abuse of the death penalty and freedom of conscience. Iranian officials have failed to provide even minimal transparency and accountability for these killings, including by facilitating the rise of abusers like Raisi to the highest levels of political leadership. 

On August 23, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination released a report foregrounding the repression of ethnic and ethno-religious minority groups during state crackdowns on countrywide protests in November 2019 and fall 2022. The Committee urged the government of Iran to “immediately conduct impartial investigations into allegations of violations and abuses of human rights committed by state actors during these protests and to provide reparation for the victims.”

In its March report to the UN Human Rights Council, the Independent International Fact-finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran found that “ethnic and religious minorities, as well as other minorities, were disproportionately impacted by the Government’s response to the protests that began in September 2022.” The Mission elaborated such violations in its August report, noting that, against a backdrop of grave human rights violations, “the Government continues to take concerted measures to silence victims, their families as well as those supporting them to seek truth, equality, justice and reparations, such as lawyers and journalists.” The Mission urged the government of Iran to “Undertake effective, thorough, independent, impartial and transparent investigations into crimes and violations of international law, human rights, and international criminal law described in this document, in accordance with international standards.”