The Illusion of Influence: Iran’s Fictional Tale of Soleimani and Putin

Iranwire – The manufactured narrative of Qassem Soleimani’s influence over Vladimir Putin reveals a deliberate effort to create a political myth that has since crumbled under scrutiny.

This myth reached its peak following Soleimani’s assassination in 2020, as officials from the Islamic Republic increasingly portrayed him as an unparalleled strategic mastermind.

Central to this narrative was the claim that Soleimani secretly visited Moscow in 2015, where he allegedly convinced Putin to intervene militarily in Syria.

This story served clear political purposes. It positioned Iran as a key power broker capable of influencing Russian policy, elevated the IRGC’s diplomatic standing, and constructed a compelling, heroic narrative around Soleimani as a martyr.

However, the release of documents five years after Soleimani’s death has wholly unraveled this fiction. 

The evidence reveals that Soleimani’s actual interactions with Russian officials bore no resemblance to the claims made by Iranian authorities.

Soleimani, until his assassination, was the longest-serving commander among the four branches of the IRGC, directly appointed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

In 2007, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on Soleimani for his involvement in aiding the development of Iran’s nuclear program, including travel bans and asset freezes outside Iran.

During the 12 years of sanctions, Soleimani frequently traveled to regional countries, including Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.

However, his alleged visits to Russia became a focal point for speculation and manipulation, particularly by Russian officials.

Reports of Soleimani’s trips to Russia surfaced on three occasions, with Russian officials denying two of them.

One of the most publicized claims came in April 2016 when Fox News reported that Soleimani had made a secret trip to Russia aboard a Mahan Air private jet, allegedly meeting Vladimir Putin. The Kremlin swiftly dismissed the report, while Iranian officials declined to comment.

At the same time, Fars News, an IRGC-linked outlet, claimed Soleimani had visited Moscow for talks with Putin. However, the Kremlin spokesperson dismissed the story that very day.

The only confirmed visit occurred in the summer of 2015, shortly after the Iran nuclear deal was finalized. This trip holds significant insights.

In January 2015, as Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria faced growing pressure from opposition forces, Soleimani sought permission to visit Moscow.

Russia, however, did not approve the trip until June 2015. A leaked audio file revealed that former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif disclosed that Russia, not Iran, initiated Soleimani’s trip to Moscow.

Zarif said, “The trip happened at Moscow’s intention, not ours… They had already decided on their intervention in Syria.”

Iranian officials depicted Soleimani as the architect who persuaded Putin to intervene militarily in Syria, claiming that he presented maps and made a compelling case during a two-hour meeting. Brigadier General Mohammad Jafar Asadi, commander of IRGC forces in Syria, even asserted that Soleimani personally convinced Putin to deploy Russian troops in Syria during this encounter.

However, the available evidence contradicts these claims. Putin had already decided on Russian military intervention in Syria, and weapons shipment to Russian bases in Syria had begun before Soleimani’s visit.

Zarif said, “We claim Soleimani dragged Putin into war. But Putin had made his decision. He entered the war with air power but brought in Iran’s ground forces. Before that, we didn’t have ground troops—only Syrians, Arabs, Afghans, and volunteers were involved.”

While Western media initially suggested Soleimani persuaded Putin, later reports revealed that Russia had already initiated large-scale shipments of weapons and equipment to its bases in Latakia and Tartus via the Bosphorus Strait well before their 2015 meeting.

Soleimani’s role in Moscow was more aligned with coordinating military operations for Russian forces on the ground than a strategist convincing Putin to enter the war.

Any collaboration between Soleimani and Russian officials in the summer of 2015 was more in line with Moscow’s pre-existing policies and strategic interests.

Soleimani’s meetings in Moscow likely focused on optimizing Russia’s air power, which would soon be deployed at Syria’s Khmeimim Air Base. In subsequent months, Soleimani played a key role in coordinating air and ground operations between Russian, Iranian, and Syrian forces.

However, Zarif later disclosed that the Russians often sidelined Soleimani and the Islamic Republic in Syria.

The inflated narrative surrounding Soleimani as a key architect of Russia’s military intervention in Syria fails to align with the reality that Russia’s decision to intervene was firmly rooted in its own strategic interests long before Soleimani’s trip.

At the time of President Hassan Rouhani’s administration, Iran was excluded from international discussions on Syria.

The IRGC had already begun deploying forces to Syria to suppress opposition to Bashar al-Assad.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei tasked Qassem Soleimani with ensuring Assad’s hold on power by cracking down on dissenters who sought regime change and improved living conditions in Syria.

Iran was not invited to the international talks on Syria, and according to senior Iranian officials, Russia did not advocate for Iran’s participation.

In his memoirs, Javad Zarif recalled that during the nuclear deal negotiations, then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry suggested, “Let’s resolve the Syria issue together. We are the real powers—let’s leave these clowns aside.”

However, Khamenei prohibited the Iranian government from engaging in non-nuclear negotiations with the U.S.

When Rouhani’s administration began, the UN Secretary-General invited several countries, including Iran, to a conference in Switzerland on Syria.

However, under Saudi pressure, the invitation to Iran was rescinded. After the nuclear deal, Iran gained a more prominent role on the global stage.

Putin, who had previously rejected Soleimani’s request to visit Moscow in 2014, sent a message inviting him to the Russian capital.

Russia made two main requests of Iran: to use Iranian airspace for missile strikes targeting Assad’s opposition and to deploy Iranian ground forces to Syria.

According to Zarif, Putin didn’t necessarily need either Iran’s airspace or the IRGC troops, given Russia’s military bases in Syria.

Instead, these moves were designed to burn bridges that might normalize relations between Iran and the West.

Zarif said, “With these two moves, Russia ensured Iran couldn’t build bridges with the West.”

Zarif wrote that Russia held a dominant position in Syria’s decision-making and was unwilling to share it with Iran. Moscow struck strategic alliances with both the U.S. and Israel, often at Iran’s expense, ignoring Iranian interests and its red lines.

“In the months leading to his martyrdom, before each trip to Moscow, Martyr Soleimani would present lengthy complaints about Russian military behavior in Syria and their disregard for Iran’s warnings and concerns. The Russians consistently left us behind in Syria.”

The military agreements between Russia and Israel in Syria remain classified, but they likely included Russia’s passive response to Israeli airstrikes on IRGC positions.

These strikes took place daily for over a decade, continuing until the final days of Assad’s government.

Zarif described how Russia’s actions reflected Soleimani’s limited influence in Syria. Zarif said, “For example, the volunteers under the command of the Quds Force bravely and selflessly recaptured Aleppo from the Takfiri militants. After the liberation of Aleppo, Russia agreed with Turkey to allow the Takfiri militants to leave Aleppo and move to Idlib, despite Iran’s repeated warnings.”

Zarif noted that Russia accepted this risk to appease Turkey and President Erdoğan.

Soleimani insisted that Iran communicate to Russia that the IRGC would not allow Turkey’s proxy forces—referred to by Iran as “takfiri terrorists” – to leave Aleppo until Shia residents of the villages of Foua and Kaferia were also evacuated.

However, under Turkish pressure, Russia coerced Assad into approving the militants’ evacuation. While Soleimani awaited the evacuation of the Shia villagers, Turkey’s proxy forces left Aleppo.

One particularly dramatic episode highlighted the tensions.

Soleimani ordered IRGC forces to block buses evacuating the militants. The buses were stranded in the desert, and during the standoff, a militant was killed, and a pregnant woman gave birth under dire conditions.

Soleimani personally confronted the Russian commander and instructed Iranian officials to relay his message to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

Although some villagers from Foua and Kaferia were evacuated, the militants hindered the process.

Ultimately, the evacuation of Aleppo’s militants proceeded as planned, revealing Russia’s strategy of exerting direct pressure on Assad to achieve its objectives.

Zarif said, “Russia made decisions, applied overt pressure on the Syrian government, and left us behind to advance its own agenda.”

A year after Soleimani visited Moscow, in August 2016, Russian media revealed that Russian bombers had been stationed at an airbase in Hamedan, Iran, and were conducting operations over Syria using Iranian territory.

The revelation caused a major uproar in Iran, as the country’s Constitution explicitly prohibits granting military bases to foreign powers.

Members of Parliament protested, expressing outrage that they had been entirely unaware of the arrangement.

This pattern of secretive decision-making resurfaced during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which also drew the Islamic Republic into the conflict.

Hossein Dehghan, Iran’s defense minister at the time, criticized Russia when the bombers left Hamedan, saying, “The Russians are eager to project their status as a superpower and secure their role in shaping Syria’s political future.”

His comments highlighted the fact that despite the Islamic Republic’s attempts to portray a strong military alliance with Russia, the relationship was far weaker than shown.

Despite these differences, Soleimani’s role in Syria was central to Iran’s objective of preserving Assad’s regime and securing a land corridor to Hezbollah. Meanwhile, Russia focused on preventing Western-led regime changes in authoritarian states.

In the years that followed, it became clear that Russia had little interest in sharing its influence in Syria with Iran.

During a joint meeting of foreign and defense ministers from Iran, Turkey, and Russia, hosted by Moscow, Dehghan and Zarif were set to attend.

However, just before the meeting, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council issued a directive barring Dehghan from attending the multilateral session, leaving him to focus on bilateral talks.

The decision to sideline Iran’s Defense Ministry effectively neutralized the body expected to represent Soleimani’s interests in the negotiations. Zarif later admitted that he was never given an explanation for this abrupt directive.

Following Soleimani’s assassination, the commander of Russian forces in Syria led a military delegation to the Iranian embassy in Damascus to pay his respects. Russia condemned the U.S. drone strike that killed Soleimani, praised his contributions, and expressed verbal support for Iran but avoided deeper commitments, whether military, political, or diplomatic.

Now, five years after Soleimani’s death near Baghdad, following his departure from Damascus, his influence in Syria has all but vanished. Groups labeled as “terrorists” by the Iranian authorities have since taken over the country.