The Fall of Assad: Iran’s Middle East Illusion Crumbles

Iranwire – The al-Eis region vividly illustrates Iran’s dramatically transformed fortunes in Syria. 

In 2014, Qasem Soleimani captured the area through intense missile strikes and celebrated the victory with jubilant photographs. Today, neither Soleimani lives nor the Syrian government maintains control—a stark metaphor for the complete reversal of Iran’s regional ambitions.

Iran’s relationship with Syria has always been more complex than it appeared. While Tehran was a key supporter of Assad’s regime throughout the civil war, providing extensive military and financial assistance, the alliance was never as deep as Iran’s ties with Hezbollah.

Assad consistently played a diplomatic game, balancing Iranian influence while skillfully maintaining relationships with Russia and Arab states.

Mehdi Taeb, commander of the Ammar Headquarters, said in 2012 that Syria was Iran’s “35th province,” a strategic area considered more important than its own.

“If the enemy attacks and tries to take Syria or Khuzestan,” Taeb told Basij students, “our priority is to keep Syria.” That bold statement now echoes with irony. The “province” has fallen, turning Iran’s strategic dream into a nightmare of rapid disintegration.

The scale of Iran’s military involvement was unprecedented. By mid-2022, Iran controlled 570 of 830 foreign military bases in Syria, a 69 percent presence compared to the United States’ 4 percent. Once thought to be untouchable, these strongholds collapsed in just 11 days.

How Did Iran Enter Syria?

A decade ago, after capturing al-Eis, the Islamic Republic had already lost several forces in Syria, though its presence remained unclear. It had been established two years earlier.

IRGC commanders spoke of “advisors” in Syria while denying the presence of military forces. At the same time, Javad Karimi-Ghodousi, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of Parliament, revealed that “hundreds of Iranian brigades” were in Syria.

The first news of Iranian forces in Syria surfaced in early 2012, with a report from the Wall Street Journal on August 28, 2012. It revealed the deployment of “several IRGC commanders,” Quds Force commanders, and “hundreds of regular soldiers” to Syria.

In early 2012, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said, “Iran will defend Syria because it supported the resistance line against the Zionist regime,” without mentioning Iran’s military presence. Later, in September 2012, IRGC Commander Mohammad Ali Jafari said, “Due to the special conditions in Lebanon and Syria, some Quds Force personnel have been present in these areas, but this does not mean our military presence there.”

This was the first time an Iranian official acknowledged the presence of IRGC forces in Syria. However, the statement caused tensions with neighboring countries, especially Lebanon, leading to accusations that the media distorted Jafari’s words.

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Ramin Mehmanparast, said, “Iran has no military presence in the region, especially in Syria.”

This followed accusations from U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta on August 15, 2012, in which he said that Iran was providing military support to Assad. Panetta said that there was evidence showing the IRGC was expanding its forces in Syria and “training militia forces to fight on behalf of the regime.”

Later, Mahmoud Chaharbaghi, the IRGC artillery commander in Syria, explained, “The Supreme Leader told General Soleimani, ‘Go and save Bashar al-Assad.’ Soleimani’s mission was to prevent Bashar al-Assad’s government from falling in Syria. At that time, ISIS had not yet emerged – the opponents of Bashar al-Assad had risen against him. ISIS came later.”

Iran’s involvement in Syria was shrouded in ambiguity, and officials were reluctant to discuss it for years openly. Tehran also downplayed Russia’s role. The Islamic Republic claimed that Russia intervened militarily after a meeting between Qasem Soleimani and Vladimir Putin.

Some IRGC commanders, like Chaharbaghi and Mohammad Jafar Asadi, mentioned Soleimani’s role in persuading Putin, while Mohammad Javad Zarif offered a different version, saying, “Putin had already made his decision and entered with the air force, but Iran’s ground forces also joined the war.”

Iran’s Costs and Military Presence in Syria

Initially, Iran justified its support for Syria as a countermeasure to Israel, downplaying the ideological significance of Shia shrines. However, with the arrival of the first “martyrs” in Tehran in 2013, the discourse shifted, emphasizing religious values as the primary motivation. Groups like “Defenders of the Shrine” in Qom, with slogans against imperialism and in opposition to Wahhabism and Salafism, became tools for recruitment.

Reports suggest that in the first three years, around 10,000 Iranian forces and 20,000 to 30,000 Iranian-backed Shia militia fighters were active in Syria. By 2018, the Israeli Ambassador to the UN said that over 80,000 Shia militia fighters controlled by Iran, with some trained by the IRGC, operated in Syria.

Iran’s presence has come at a heavy cost. In 2015, Stefano De Mistura, an Italian politician and former member of the Italian government, said that Iran provided $6 billion annually to Assad’s government.

Other estimates range from $3.5 to $4 billion per year. The World Bank also estimated the cost of the Syrian war and its regional consequences at $35 billion, with 260,000 deaths in the first five years.

In 2019, Heshamatollah Falahatpisheh, a member of the National Security Committee, said, “When I went to Syria, some said I incurred expenses, but I repeat, we may have spent $20 to $30 billion in Syria, and we need to recover those costs. The people’s money was spent there.”

In 2023, a confidential Iranian Presidential Office document revealed that Iran had spent over $50 billion on the Syrian civil war, but only around $18 billion could be recovered through projects like phosphate mining, exploiting oil fields, and operating mobile networks spread over 50 years.

The projects required an additional investment of approximately $947 million from Iran. There is no exact figure for Syria’s debt to Iran in the military sector, and the repayment of these expenses remains unclear.

Human Rights Situation in Syria and Iran’s Role in Escalating the Crisis

On the morning of August 20, 2013, the Ghouta region near Damascus witnessed one of the most horrific chemical attacks of the century. The Bashar al-Assad regime used sarin gas, a deadly nerve agent, to kill over 1,400 civilians, an act described by the UN as a “crime against humanity.” This attack marked the climax of the regime’s atrocities against the Syrian people, shocking the world.

Since the civil war began in 2011, Syria has become one of the world’s largest human rights crises.

By 2023, the Syrian Network for Human Rights reported over 222 chemical attacks, 98 percent of which were attributed to the Assad regime. Widespread arrests, torture, and deadly sieges have also been used to suppress opposition.

Many view the Islamic Republic of Iran as an accomplice to these crimes, as one of Assad’s primary supporters, further escalating the crisis.

Iran’s interventions have exacerbated demographic shifts, sectarian tensions, and social instability in Syria.

Tehran’s policy of Shia Islamization targeted strategic regions like southern Damascus, the Zaynabiyya area, Deir ez-Zor, Aleppo, and areas along the borders with Israel, Lebanon, and Iraq.

This policy included recruiting children, teens, militia families, and even tribal leaders and influential local figures, building local loyalty by reconstructing schools, establishing cultural and educational centers such as “Imam Mehdi” and “Velayat,” and offering financial and social services.

In response to these human rights violations by the Assad regime and the Islamic Republic, the international community imposed wide-ranging sanctions on Syria, including the Caesar Act in June 2020, which targeted Syrian officials and their backers, including Iran—the sanctions aimed to limit the Assad regime’s ability to continue its repression.

Iran’s Diplomatic Presence in Syria

In December 2012, the Islamic Republic presented a six-point plan to gain recognition as a diplomatic actor in Syria.

The plan called for an immediate cessation of violence under United Nations supervision, the provision of humanitarian aid, the initiation of national dialogue to form a transitional government, the release of political prisoners, guarantees for media freedom, and the formation of a committee to rebuild Syria’s infrastructure. 

Although the plan was designed to end the conflict, it failed to yield results. 

That same year, then-Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Ali Larijani, said, “Iran has always supported democratic and genuine reforms in Syria and consistently opposed foreign adventurism in the country.”

At the same time, the Islamic Republic staunchly defended Assad’s regime in international forums.

In 2015, Ali Akbar Velayati, advisor to the Supreme Leader, declared, “Syria is our red line, and we will not allow anyone to intervene with the aim of overthrowing its government.”

Iran viewed this stance as part of its broader resistance axis policy, seeing the Assad regime as essential for countering Israeli influence and maintaining ties with Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Iran had solidified its position in Syria to the point where finding a solution to the crisis without its involvement seemed impossible.

In 2017, Iran actively participated in the Syrian peace negotiations, known as the Astana talks, alongside Russia and Turkey. These talks aimed to find a political solution to the Syrian crisis, and throughout the process, Iran emphasized that Syria’s political future should include Assad remaining in power.

The talks, in turn, became another reason for Iran to remain in Syria.