A Friendship Bought in Blood: Iran’s Lost Syrian Gambit

Iranwire – The relationship between Iran and Syria represents one of the Middle East’s most complex diplomatic partnerships.

Long before the Syrian civil war thrust the two nations into the global spotlight, their alliance was based on practical geopolitical reasons that defied regional expectations.

The Islamic Republic’s support for Bashar al-Assad has historical roots in the relationship between two authoritarian states in the region.

During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Syria stood alone among Arab states in refusing to support Saddam Hussein’s attack on Iran – a decision that laid the groundwork for a strategic partnership that would reshape Middle Eastern politics.

The alignment was particularly remarkable given that both Iraq and Syria were led by Ba’ath Party regimes – an ideology technically opposed to Iran’s revolutionary Islamic system.

The alliance deepened under Bashar al-Assad’s leadership, becoming a critical lifeline for the Syrian regime during the brutal civil war that erupted in 2011.

Iran’s military and diplomatic support prevented the collapse of Assad’s government and transformed Syria into a critical forward-operating base for Iranian strategic interests.

For Iran, Syria represented more than just a diplomatic ally – it became a crucial corridor for supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon and maintaining a presence on Israel’s borders.

The conflict effectively transformed Syria into a primary battleground for Iran’s regional ambitions, particularly its confrontation with Israel.

Although the Syrian government claims to be secular, this alliance has been reinforced by religious and ideological ties.

Decades before the Islamic Revolution, Syria’s Alavi leadership was recognized as part of the Shia community by prominent figures like Musa al-Sadr, a leading Shia cleric, and Ali Shariati, an Islamic thinker.

Several Shia pilgrimage sites are located in Damascus, Syria’s capital. This is why the Islamic Republic refers to its military presence in Syria as “defense of the shrine,” referring to these sacred sites.

Both countries present themselves as committed to “resistance” against Israel. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei once described Assad’s Syria as “the frontline of resistance against the Zionist regime.”

Even Libya, which sold weapons to Iran during the war, maintained its relations with Saddam Hussein and voted alongside Iraq during Arab League sessions.

Iran repaid Assad’s favor by supplying Syria with oil. However, the real cost came when Bashar al-Assad’s survival during the civil war faced its gravest threat.

For the first time, the Iranian government deployed the Quds Force, the extraterritorial branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and even regular army commanders, albeit on a smaller scale, under the guise of an “advisory mission.”

This marked the beginning of an extraordinarily costly military intervention to support Assad.

The Syrian crisis has been the bloodiest and most devastating civil war in the region. The Islamic Republic, as a foreign actor in Syria and near Israel’s borders, expended vast financial and military resources.

General Qassem Soleimani, the late IRGC Quds Force commander, spent much of his time in Syria after the outbreak of the civil war.

Soleimani was traveling from Damascus to Iraq just hours before being killed in a U.S. airstrike near Baghdad in January 2020.

Reclaiming territories occupied by Assad’s opponents and preventing Damascus’s fall – key to the regime’s survival – were hailed by the Islamic Republic as Soleimani’s victories.

Khamenei described the Quds Force as “soldiers without borders,” while Iran’s then-Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif called Soleimani a “commander in the fight against terrorism,” claiming that the U.S. and Europe owed him gratitude for his efforts in Iraq and Syria.

The idea of forming various militias, later known as the “Axis of Resistance,” emerged during Syria’s civil war and the IRGC’s presence there.

The Axis of Resistance refers to seemingly independent militias that are financially, militarily, and operationally under the IRGC’s complete control.

This allowed the Islamic Republic to direct attacks against the U.S. and Israel without bearing direct responsibility for the consequences.

The IRGC went so far as to train and deploy Afghan and Pakistani Shia migrants to Syria’s battlefields.

Commanders from Tehran directed these fighters, leading groups like the Fatemiyoun Brigade – composed of Afghan Shias – and the Zeinabiyoun Brigade – comprised of Pakistani Shias – which was eventually designated as a terrorist group by Pakistan. Their missions, along with Hezbollah members, involved fighting on Syria’s front lines.

Iran also interfered in Syria’s most sensitive defense and military affairs, using Syrian territory to transfer advanced weapons to Hezbollah.

The Battle to Save Hafez’s Son

Since Syria’s conflict began, Bashar al-Assad increasingly relied on Iran, with the IRGC’s Quds Force playing a central role in his regime and paving the way for Russia’s involvement.

Initially, the Islamic Republic sought to prevent Assad’s fall and stabilize his regime by halting the loss of Damascus and strategic northern cities to rebels. Iran’s support included arms transfers, economic aid, and military advisory roles.

It is reported that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, then-President of Iran, opposed IRGC military involvement in Syria at the time. However, such decisions in Iran fall under the purview of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

About four years into the conflict, the growing success of groups like ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and other rebel factions raised serious doubts about Assad’s ability to survive.

Viewing Assad’s survival as a strategic imperative, Iran ramped up its support, increasing its intervention and playing a key role alongside Russia in shifting the war in Assad’s favor.

Shia fighters formed the backbone of battles that secured significant territorial gains against opposition forces, including the capture of Aleppo, once Syria’s economic hub.

These forces then turned their focus to eastern Syria, engaging in limited skirmishes with Western-backed militias fighting ISIS.

Iran’s deepened presence in Syria during the conflict served not only to support an ally but also to secure its long-term foothold.

Iran’s massive financial, material, and human investments signaled its intent to maintain a lasting presence in Syria.

The increasing presence led to ongoing clashes between Iran and Israel. Initially, Iran denied that the positions targeted by Israeli airstrikes belonged to the IRGC.

On one occasion, Admiral Ali Shamkhani, then Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, even claimed Israel had struck a carpet warehouse.

Over time, however, Israeli airstrikes became routine, with the Israeli Air Force targeting IRGC bases and weapons convoys in Syria for more than a decade.

These attacks increased in April this year with an airstrike on Iran’s consulate in Syria, resulting in the deaths of several senior IRGC commanders, including Mohammad Reza Zahedi – the IRGC’s most significant loss in Syria since Qassem Soleimani’s assassination.

Ultimately, this conflict escalated into direct strikes between Iran and Israel.

One reason the Trump administration designated the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization and a legitimate target for U.S. forces was its actions in Syria and Iraq.

The IRGC’s extensive military presence in Syria not only landed it on the U.S. terrorist list but also contributed to America’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal.

During negotiations for the nuclear deal, U.S. senators and policymakers warned that the funds released to Iran would be used to strengthen militias and destabilize the region.

After the agreement was finalized, Khamenei declared that Iran would not stop supporting these groups financially.

Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah – a key Iranian proxy recently killed in an Israeli operation – similarly welcomed the deal, saying that whenever Iran had funds, groups like his would benefit.

In a leaked audio file, then-Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif recounted how U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry confronted him about a surge in Iran Air flights to Damascus for transporting weapons aboard passenger planes after sanctions on IranAir were lifted.

Zarif claimed he had queried the Minister of Roads and Urban Development, who denied knowledge of the flights, and the head of IranAir, who revealed that Soleimani had personally requested the increased flights.

When Zarif protested to Soleimani, the Quds Force commander reportedly responded that IranAir was the safest option for moving weapons to Syria.

Iran Air’s sanctions dated back to the 1980s and were unrelated to the nuclear issue. However, under the Obama administration and with Kerry’s support, the airline was removed from sanctions, enabling it to sign significant deals, including a large purchase from Airbus and a $16 billion agreement with Boeing – the largest U.S.-Iran trade deal since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal canceled the agreement. Ultimately, Iran’s arms trade with Russia to support its war in Ukraine led to expanded sanctions on IranAir.

The bloody support of the Islamic Republic for Bashar al-Assad’s regime has resulted in significant consequences: the bolstering of the push to abandon the nuclear deal, increased sanctions against Iran, the designation of IranAir as a terrorist-supporting entity, the U.S. designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization, the loss of economic growth opportunities, and the crippling of Iranian economy.

Yet, the Islamic Republic took pride in claiming it had saved Assad’s regime and Syria from imminent collapse.

Now, Soleimani’s so-called successes in securing Syrian cities are quickly collapsing.

The Islamic Republic no longer has the economic capacity, robust proxy forces, or seasoned commanders like Soleimani to deploy to Syria. Meanwhile, it has wasted the past decade supporting Bashar al-Assad’s regime.