Two Iranian Studies Finally Admit the Real Reasons for Mass Protests Since 2017

Iranwire – For almost four years now, Iran has witnessed large-scale protests on a regular basis, with civic activism erupting across numerous cities and provinces across the country. The phenomenon of frequent, mass demonstrations started in December 2017 and January 2018. 

Overwhelmingly, these protests were catalyzed by the rising cost of living, but there were a number of other factors at play. Whether or not they created a climate in which others felt they could follow suit, it makes sense that analysts would look to that emblematic first winter to learn more about Iranian society and protest today.

The Iranian quarterly journal Social Research has done just that, publishing a detailed study on the root causes of the popular protests of December 2017 and January 2018. Talking to 250 experts, the study, entitled “Relative Deprivation and Capacity Building for the Social Crisis,” reveals that the contributing factors of an economy blighted by endemic corruption, discrimination and social inequality and judicial foul play led to the majority of the Iranian population experiencing poverty and deprivation.

The study also looks at other factors driving the protests, including high unemployment and the climate of impunity Iran’s corrupt government officials enjoy.

***

December 28, 2017 is regarded by many as one of the most important days in the history of the Islamic Republic, when the country — and then the world — saw collective, local protest in the city of Mashhad spread to dozens of other cities in Iran in a manner of a few days.

Kermanshah, Hamedan, Rasht, Isfahan, Ahvaz, Qom, Sari, Zahedan, Qazvin, Lorestan, Quchan and Saveh were among the cities where popular protests took place in January 2018, following on from the Mashhad demonstrations. All of these protests were suppressed by police and security forces.

The protests grew fast and quickly became focused on issues well beyond rising costs and a failing economy. Eventually people turned their protest against the Islamic Republic regime itself, and the foundation on which it was built. They spurred on further protests in summer 2018, and culminated in the huge protests of November 2019.

The protesters were mostly from the lower echelons of Iranian society, a large group of society that Iranian officials have labeled as the “oppresed” [mostazafin] class, and who they have recognized for more than 40 years as being the regime’s most important supporters. But in January 2018 and November 2019 especially, this bubble burst, revealing that these are the sections of society most severely affected by the country’s entrenched problems — and the most dissatisfied with the regime’s performance in running the country.

Both official and unofficial reports state that people who took part in protests in January 2018 and November 2019 were mostly from the poorer strata of society, people who felt they had been ignored by the corrupt and inefficient officials of the Islamic Republic. They felt humiliated and discriminated against, and their anger was visible; They shouted anti-regime slogans and in some cases damaged buildings and public property.

The 250 scholars and university professors who took part in the Social Research journal confirmed the view that economic corruption was the main cause for the 2017 and 2018 protests, and that discrimination and social inequality had resulted in judicial injustice, poverty and deprivation.

In a society where economic corruption is on the rise, social, judicial, and political injustice occurs on a regular basis, unemployment, poverty, and deprivation quickly spread, and distrust in the regime and its officials is rife, all of which prompts authorities to make promises they simply can’t keep. This fuels a cycle of unrest, dissatisfaction and protest.

Iranian citizens in general, and those who take the decision to protest in particular, believe that corruption pervades all levels of the Islamic Republic, and that this has fueled the shocking inefficiency of the regime. In their view, there is no part of the system that has been left untouched from the contamination of corruption.

In addition, people have extremely limited access to banking facilities, further intensifying the overwhelming feeling of dissatisfaction, not least because the most prominent corruption cases in recent years have been directly linked to the banking industry, strengthening the assumption that the friends and acquaintances of banking directors and influential people are the only people entitled to the full portfolio of banking facilities and that ordinary people are simply blocked off from such services.

It’s quite rare for a study of this kind, with its traditional links to the Islamic Republic establishment, to draw a relationship between protests and high levels of dissatisfaction with and distrust of the regime. The fact that this study has highlighted such a relationship makes it evident that the roots of the protest run deep. In fact, the study goes so far as to highlight “religious tyranny” as a key factor driving deprivation.

“Revisionist” Movements but Deprivation all the Same

Another study, published by the quarterly journal Police Discipline, analyzes data from the Semnan Province Police and also looks at the roots of the November 2019 protests. 

It notes the rising price of gasoline that preceded the unrest, but, like other officials of the Islamic Republic, uses its research to point the finger at “revisionist” and “foreign enemies” as the main drivers of the nationwide protests.

In 2019, the quarterly Disciplinary Knowledge published a study on the origins of the December 2017 protests based on research conducted by Lorestan Police and specifically focusing on the city of Khorramabad. It found people’s feeling of “relative deprivation” was the most important factor that brought people out on to the streets.

But, like the Social Research journal, the study took a more honest look at why people decided to protest than many other government-linked analysis. It warned that there was a direct link between the extent and severity of government repression and the feeling of social deprivation, and that the more repression there was, the more deprivation people felt.

This issue has been ignored by Islamic Republic top officials for more than 40 years. These studies show what many journalists, activists and ordinary civilians have known for years: through its suppression of even the smallest of protests, Iran’s leaders brought what happened in 2017, 2018 and 2019 on themselves. By increasing the scope of dissatisfaction, they brought the situation to boiling point, where, for the first time, people who had never considered the overthrow of the regime now wondered if it was an idea they could get behind. Certainly, they were ready to go out on the streets and make their voices heard and their anger clear.